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 1. Introduction 
 
Development policy has been energized in the last decades by a number of 
contributions emphasizing a new positive role the state can and should play in fostering 
economic growth. The central pillar of this literature is Michael Porter and his theory of 
clusters. In a few words, a cluster is a bundle of industries that gain in efficiency through 
co-location. After the publication of Porter (1990), this author has quickly become the 
foremost advocate of industrial policy of our times, arguing that clusters should be central 
to any competitiveness agenda. Porter’s influence is phenomenal throughout the world.1 
He is a “guru” of economic development, “spiritual father” of numerous research 
institutes, cluster initiatives and projects, and advisor for economic development policy in 
many countries. In Europe in particular, where governments are more prone to a 
centralized development strategy, clusters have become increasingly an objective of 
economic policy.2 
The cluster theory – reflecting the professional formation if its author as 
management strategist – underlines the gains expected to accrue from the regional 
concentration of related industries and makes the normative statement that governments 
should boost the development of clusters. Whatever its influence on policymakers across 
the world, the theory lacked any positive explanation about the necessity of government 
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intervention in the natural functioning of the market.3 Emphasizing the merits of 
industrial agglomeration, it did not provided an answer to the essential question: could 
not these benefits be obtained on a free market, in the absence of any interference of the 
government? Does the potential existence of cluster benefits validate the common 
sugestion that countries should promote regional development through cluster policies? 
 A number of economists have attempted to anchor the appetite for clustering 
initiatives in solid theoretical bedrock. They have pointed out an interesting market 
failure that may prevent the emergence of profitable clusters and thus jeopardize overall 
economic development: the failure of individuals to coordinate changes in their actions in 
order to reap the benefits of a better situation.4 Although the literature on coordination 
problems has a long tradition,5 only recently it has become concerned with the relation 
between this supposed type of market failure and the alleged benefits of industrial 
agglomeration. Economists like Rodrik (2004) and Rodriguez-Clare (2005a; 2005b) have 
used this particular market failure argument as justification for a porterian-style “new 
industrial policy”, the goal of which is to induce entrepreneurs to invest in those projects 
with the highest social return. 
As the coordination externality argument goes, many investment projects require 
simultaneous investments in complementary production processes. Firms can improve 
their performance if entrepreneurs realize that their individual success is dependent on the 
actions of other market participants. They can get organized to identify common 
challenges, for example that all companies would profit from a specific training program 
at the local university, from an investment in improving transport facilities, or from a 
joint effort to upgrade the local power or water supply. For an individual company it 
would not make sense to address such issues but for the group as a whole they become 
hugely beneficial efforts. Put it differently, the social rate of return on investments in key 
projects is higher than the pure private return. This means that coordination will be 
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under-supplied and that government should correct market failure, providing proper 
incentives in order to reach the optimal level of coordination.  
 This paper intends to provide a refutation of the idea that coordination failures as 
manifested in the inability of clusters to emerge can serve as a ground for government 
intervention. It uses mainly Porter, Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare thesis as an example of 
this approach and criticizes the claim that coordination externalities prevent the market 
process to allocate resources optimally. In our view, such an essay is important given that 
in the last years the experimentation of various cluster policies has intensified 
considerably. Indeed, one grave lesson that can be drawn from the existing literature on 
clusters is that discussion of alternative cluster policies has eclipsed the cluster theory. 
People stopped asking questions about the meaning of cluster and started to exercise 
various cluster policies instead. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the coordination 
failure argument which pushes the case for industrial policy, with a focus on the relation 
between coordination problems and Porter’s theory of clusters. Section three presents the 
policy prescriptions advanced in the new development economics literature. Section four 
provides a critical analysis of the coordination failure-based development economics. It 
explains at the outset the role of entrepreneurs in achieving coordination on a free market. 
Then, it criticizes the notion of coordination failure and underscores the weaknesses of 
cluster theory, explaining the risks associated with attempts to build clusters. Section six 
explains why the new argument of market imperfection fails to support the case for 
industrial policy. The last section concludes the paper.  
  
2. From coordination failure to cluster policy 
 
As Anderson et al. (2004, pp. 48-49) acknowledges, the foremost motive for 
pursuing cluster policies derives from a supposed market failure in achieving economic 
coordination. The best explanation of this market failure is provided by Rodriguez-Clare 
(2005) and Rodrik (2004). The former author (p. 3) points out the fact that the success or 
failure of an action depends upon the context in which it is undertaken: “A firm’s 
productivity depends not only on its own efforts and abilities, and on general economic 
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conditions (e.g., the macroeconomic environment and the legal system), but also on the 
actions of other firms, infrastructure, regulation and other public goods”. 
On a more specific note, Rodrik (pp. 12-13) notes that 
“Many projects require simultaneous, large-scale investments to be made 
in order to become profitable. […] An individual producer contemplating 
whether to invest in a greenhouse needs to know that there is an electrical 
grid he can access nearby, irrigation is available, the logistics and 
transport networks are in place, qurantine and other public health 
measures have been taken to protect his plants from his neighbors’ pests, 
and his country has been marketed abroad as a dependable supplier of 
highquality orchids. All of these services have high fixed costs, and are 
unlikely to be provided by private entities unless they have an assurance 
that there will be enough greenhouses to demand their services in the first 
place. This is a classic coordination problem. […] More generally, 
coordination failures can arise whenever new industries exhibit scale 
economies and some of the inputs are non-tradable (or require geographic 
proximity).” 
The attempt to relate the observation that any action’s result depends on the 
specific environment in which it is performed to the theory of externalities is problematic. 
As we will try to demonstrate, interpreting the coordination problem in the light of 
externalities theory is questionable. Potential weaknesses in the argumentation can pave 
the ground for mistaken policy recommendations. Before checking the line of reasoning 
for errors it is necessary to put the issue in a proper perspective. 
As Howitt (2001, pp. 3-4) argues, the coordination effort market participants put 
depends critically on their expectation that other individuals will act to take full 
advantage of potential gains from trade: “When people on one side of a market put more 
effort into the matching process, this makes it more worthwhile for those on the other 
side to do the same thing, because it makes transacting less costly for them.” For 
example, pessimistic expectations on the part of firms that they can find appropriate 
workers will make more costly for workers to find suitable jobs. A vicious circle seems to 
ensue, keeping the market at distance from an efficient allocation of resources. 
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Following a similar line of reasoning, Marshall (p. 13-14) provides a good 
explanation of what is meant by coordination failure: 
“Suppose the economic performance of a country (or a firm, 
industry, or financial market) depends on large numbers of investors being 
willing to provide funds. If it is generally believed that other investors will 
withhold funds, it is rational for any given investor to refrain from 
investing. Thus, these beliefs become self-fulfilling. This represents a 
coordination failure because everyone would be better off if all investors 
provided funds to the affected country. Unfortunately, there is no way to 
coordinate investor actions in this way.” 
More precisely, under the circumstances described above, there are multiple 
equilibria: a good equilibrium, obtained when entrepreneurs have optimistic expectations 
and thus manage to coordinate their businesses, and a bad equilibrium, resulting from 
entrepreneurs’ reluctance to invest and their failure to coordinate. When the market 
mechanism does not work, the government should coordinate (stimulate) entrepreneurs 
into the good equilibrium.  
This policy prescription echoes the arguments of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
Hirschman (1958) who argued for the necessity of a massive and concentrated 
industrialization policy (“big push” strategy) in order to break the underdevelopment 
equilibria. In light of the negative consequences of industrialization policy carried out by 
many developing countries in the 1960s and 1960s, market failure theorists are cautious, 
and insist that the solution requires skill rather than resources (Hoff, 2000). Essentially, 
the government should adopt policies that rein in the spillovers among entrepreneurs, 
paving the way for the good equilibrium. Since many spillovers are local in nature, 
geographical considerations should play an important role in the political recipe. 
 The coordination externality argument can be associated with Porter’s (1990; 
1998a; 1998b; 2000) idea that clusters, that is, regionally coordinated industries, are 
critical for overall economic growth.6 Clusters are defined as collection of related 
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activities and industries that have managed to overcome the problem of coordination.7 
“As the cluster develops it becomes a mutually reinforcing system where benefits flow 
backwards and forwards throughout the industries in the cluster.” (LeVeen, 1998). 
Clusters arise because companies are stimulated to locate near one another to take 
advantage from the existence of a variety of external effects. The literature emphasizing 
these externalities is considerable.8 The basic reason for clustering is the minimization of 
transportation and communication costs. Also, geographical proximity gives companies 
the possibility to access a large pool of suppliers (including skilled workforce) and thus 
reduce search costs, which positively impacts productivity. In addition, industrial 
agglomeration facilitates the flow of tacit knowledge among firms (Desrochers, 2001), 
creating an “environment of learning”, and allowing companies to more efficiently 
acquire “know-how” and accelerate innovation. More generally, “agglomeration 
fundamentally serves to increase the opportunities for exchange and to reduce the 
incidence of missing markets” (Gordon and McCann, 2000, p. 518).9 This perspective is 
supported by Porter (1998), who argued that “being part of a cluster allows companies to 
operate more productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology, and 
needed institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating 
improvement.” 
The normative implication of the agglomeration effects argument is that the state 
should promote the formation of clusters. In Porter’s view, “clusters should represent an 
important component of state and local economic policy” (Porter 2000, p. 29.). 
Alternatively, one can use cluster-based policy as a tool to remove the imperfections of 
the free market by facilitating the coordination of economic agents: “Clusters provide 
opportunities for microeconomic interventions that promote coordination” (Rodriguez-
Clare 2005, p. 3). Consequently, the government should promote the development of 
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clusters by inducing entrepreneurs to invest in those projects that offer high spillover 
effects.  
This new ground for industrial policy has found an increasing number of 
supporters among policymakers throughout the world. According to Danson and Whittam 
(1999), “Many areas around the developed world are adopting the clusters approach to 
regional economic regeneration, with the United Kingdom-wide government Department 
of Trade and Industry suggesting that this could be a key element in re-establishing the 
competitiveness of national businesses in the future.” 
At the present, the opinion that clusters can play an important role in fostering 
industrial development is widely held among development strategists and government 
consultants.10 All international economic organizations – OECD, the World Bank, IMF, 
UNIDO and UNCTAD – are engaged in sponsoring research, evaluation and 
development of cluster or cluster policies throughout the world.11 Under the label of 
“cluster policy” public authorities actively encouraged the establishment of “science 
parks”, “business incubators”, “(eco-)industrial parks”, “industrial districts”, “targeted 
recruitment”, “enterprise zones”, “foreign trade zones”, “centers of expertise”, and a 
large variety of other economic experiments designed to enhance industrial concentration 
and cooperation. 
 
3. Coordination and government intervention 
 
How is government supposed to improve the coordination of market participants? 
As Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 30) argues, “One interesting approach would be for the 
government to create a mechanism whereby business associations representing different 
clusters would submit proposals that identify areas for collective action and public 
support. The different proposals would be reviewed by a “panel of experts,” who would 
rank them according to the estimated social return for the public investment. Finally, the 
best projects would be selected for support.” 
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The proponents of the new industrial policy are aware that past interventionism 
has failed systematically to promote growth and prosperity all over the world, and they 
are very cautious to differentiate their opinions about market failure from the older view 
of government’s superiority.12 Porter (2000, p. 27) argues that “a role for government 
cluster development and upgrading should not be confused with the notion of industrial 
policy” and that “the intellectual foundations of cluster theory and industrial policy are 
fundamentally different, as are their implications for government policy.” Rodriguez-
Clare (2005, p. 29-30) holds a similar opinion, maintaining that “if one wanted to call the 
current proposal a sort of industrial policy, it would be a “soft” industrial policy, rather 
than the “hard” industrial policy implemented in previous decades, which entailed 
distorting prices so as to reallocate resources to certain sectors as a way to generate a new 
pattern of comparative advantage […] This is important because soft policies are likely to 
be more transparent and less costly.” Likewise, referring to the manner in which various 
industrial projects are to be evaluated by government officials, Rodrik (2004, p. 27) 
appreciates that “Proposals need to be made public, formally analyzed and evaluated by 
technocrats, and their fiscal impact costed out.” 
According to the proponents of the new industrial policy, the government should 
shift the attention from individual firms and industries to clusters. Rodriguez-Clare 
(2005, p. 28) points out that unlike the old strategy, which attempted to pick winners (that 
is, individual companies), “policy should pick clusters”, and Porter complements this 
arguing that instead of targeting specific clusters, all existing and emerging clusters 
deserve attention. 
In spite of its popularity among economists and policymakers, the case for the 
new industrial policy cannot be taken for granted. In particular, the idea that 
interdependencies among market participants prevent an optimal allocation of resources, 
as well as the policy recommendation based on it, should be considered carefully. 
 
4. Issues to consider with cluster theory 
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A number of considerations prompt us to claim that coordination-based model of 
market failure in development does not enrich the understanding of how entrepreneurship 
contributes to development, is unrealistic and internally inconsistent. In what follows, we 
will analyze some of its weaknesses closely. 
 
4.1. Entrepreneurship and coordination 
 
The proponents of coordination failure argument provide a very simple definition 
of coordination. In their view, coordination problems typically arise when “profitable 
new industries fail to develop unless upstream and downstream investments are coaxed 
simultaneously” (Rodrik 2004, p. 13). For example, “building an airport in a region that 
has no hotels would not lead to any traffic, but hotels without a regional airport may not 
be profitable either” (Rodriguez-Clare, 2005, p. 10). 
This view of coordination may be considered as simply a truism. If a successful 
investment occurs, it is profitable because it is properly integrated into a network of 
complementary businesses. Inversely, any investment failure brings a loss because it does 
not fit in a suitable network of complementary businesses. 
In this perspective, coordination is conceived as a technological problem. 
Coordination is achieved whenever a group of complementary investments are set up 
simultaneously. But technological complementarity does not lead automatically to 
economic efficiency. Usually, there are several (possibly many) technological 
possibilities of producing a given good, and a lot more possibilities of producing 
complementary goods. To take the above-mentioned example, various types of hotels 
operate with various degrees of profitability if transportation is available via railroad, 
highway or airport. And one cannot predict that simultaneous investments in building 
hotels and transportation will be profitable. 
Alternatively, coordination can be viewed not as a problem of technical 
complementarity/compatibility between different economic units, or as a problem of 
synchronization of producers, but as a relation between producers and consumers. 
Following Mises (1998), we should consider coordination as the result of entrepreneurial 
actions. The market process effectively coordinates productive efforts because the 
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structure of prices is shaped according to the relative importance of resources for their 
final users – the consumers.13 More precisely, by forecasting future market conditions, 
entrepreneurs bid for resources in an attempt to increase investments in those production 
processes with the highest expected rate of return, that is, resulting in the output of those 
goods consumers need most. Thus, because the prices for factors of production are 
continuously adjusted to the expected prices of final goods, the emerging constellation of 
prices coordinates the various uses of resources and result in a coherent structure of 
production. 
The essential instrument used by entrepreneurs in deciding upon the allocation of 
resources is monetary calculation. If their undertaking ends with a profit, then it means 
that resources were brought in line with consumers’ needs. If the result is a loss, then 
inputs were diverted from their optimal employment and wasted into less important 
production processes. Investors and producers are stimulated to coordinate their 
businesses in order to respond to consumption demand. On a free market, production is 
rational and coherent, always subordinated to consumers’ wishes. 
Besides adopting an inadequate perspective on coordination, the market failure 
argument is unfeasible on its own grounds. In the next sections we explore in more detail 
some of its shortcomings.14  
 
4.2 The fallacy of coordination failure 
 
Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 4) starts his difficult way into the externalities 
argument by maintaining that “investment by one firm can have a positive effect on the 
profitability of investment by other firms, because higher investment gives rise to an 
increase in aggregate demand, which under economies of scale increases profitability of 
investment elsewhere in the economy”.15 Yet why does investment itself enhance the 
profitability of all the other projects? At a closer look, it seems obvious that a particular 
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investment can have a negative, as well as a positive impact on other businesses. For 
example, the decision to build a bridge will promote road transportation but will 
necessarily undermine shipping businesses. It is not clear how an investment is good for 
society simply because it has beneficial implications on certain other entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
Suppose that I am contemplating the possibility of building a fancy restaurant. 
Following Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare, there are multiple equilibria. On the one hand, if 
I intend to locate my restaurant in the middle of a future poor neighbourhood, there are 
few chances that the restaurant will operate profitable. On the other hand, if I intend to 
situate my business in what is going to become a rich residential area, then probably it 
will attract many customers and the restaurant will prove a good investment. Obviously, 
in the latter situation, the restaurant will integrate successfully in the community; my 
investment in opening the restaurant will be consistent with the potential customers’ 
decision to inhabit the same region. But, as the authors object, one can never be sure that 
this (good) equilibrium will actually occur, because potential customers do not know 
about my intention to build the restaurant, and, in turn, I do not know about how many of 
them intend to live in my neighbourhood. Cautious individuals may choose not move in, 
even though in the opposite case all of us would be better of and coordination achieved. 
So, why not convince the government to make the rich people move in the 
neighbourhood? Thus, coordination will be much easier to accomplish! The fact that 
nobody will find this idea reasonable is sufficient proof that the coordination failure 
argument proves far too much. In addition, the argument is silent about the fate of the 
individuals who actually live in my neighbourhood. When potential restaurant’s 
customers are moved in, the present inhabitants are moved out. It is clear that this 
dislocation creates its own problems. But the advocates of state intervention overlook the 
discoordination resulted from this forced coordination.  
Another point in the coordination failure argument is that coordination is costly. 
As Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 6) explains: 
“One can think of a similar story to the one above, where 
coordination failures arise between workers thinking about investing in 
training and firms thinking about investing in technologies that require 
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trained workers […] Although a firm can contract with a worker so that 
they both invest in training and technology, and split the realized surplus, 
a problem arises because of the risk of separation. At that point, the firm 
would have to look for a trained worker, and the trained worker has to 
look for a job in a firm with modern technology. Given search costs, 
however, there is a risk that a productive match will not materialize, in 
which case firms and workers will have lost their investment.” 
The thesis that search costs undermines entrepreneurial coordination is 
misleading. There is no such thing as cost-free action. Search costs, like transportation 
costs or labor costs are economic costs which must be taken into account before deciding 
upon the allocation of resources. The fact that the height of search costs discourages 
some action is no more relevant that the fact that high transportation costs prevents a 
doctor from selling his services to a distant customer. If we pursue the argument to its 
logical conclusion, we will maintain that this is a good reason for state subsidization of  
the doctor’s distant activity. But this is hardly acceptable. Therefore, it is obvious that 
one cannot derive any sound conclusion by comparing real world situations with the 
(perfect competition-based) model of Rodrik, where search is costless. 
Further, search costs cannot be eliminated through state action, they can only be 
transferred onto other people. The government has to incur itself some search costs 
(associated with the implementation of cluster development strategies), and covers them 
through taxation. A natural question then is why are these costs more important than 
taxation? In the absence of a scientific answer, the sensible economist is encouraged to 
regard with caution the enthusiastic claims of coordination failure theorists and clusters’ 
advocates.16 
Considerations about the confusing nature of coordination failure arguments 
represent, however, only part of the story in the critique of modern development policy. 
We will turn now to the flaws in the case for clustering initiatives.  
 
4.3 The irrelevance of cluster concept 
                                                          
16
 Indeed, in their imaginative scenarios of cluster development strategies development economists seem to 
rely on little more than statist presupositions and popular dogma about market failure. 
 13 
 
Let us focus first on the (lack of) significance of the cluster notion. Clusters are 
often seen as successful attempts to overcome coordination failures. According to Porter 
(1998, p. 226), “a cluster is a form of network that occurs within a geographical location, 
in which the proximity of firms and institutions ensures certain forms of commonality 
and increases the frequency and impact of interactions”. From the very beginning, it is 
important to note the vagueness of this definition. As Martin and Sunley (2003, p. 10) 
emphasize, 
“the obvious problem raised by these cluster definitions is the lack of clear 
boundaries, both industrial and geographical. At what level of industrial 
aggregation should a cluster be defined, and what range of related or 
associated industries and activities should be included? How strong do the 
linkages between firms have to be? How economically specialized does a 
local concentration of firms have to be to constitute a cluster? […] At 
what spatial scale, and over what geographical range, do clustering 
processes (inter-firm linkages, knowledge spillovers, rivalry, business and 
social networks, and so on) operate? What spatial density of such firms 
and their interactions defines a cluster?” 
The fuzzy meaning of the cluster concept has been referred to by various analysts 
as part of the intentional style of Porter, who seeks to provide policymakers with an 
argument for exercising interventionism. Porter’s idea serves as basis for a redefinition of 
interventionist policy, following the obvious intellectual bankruptcy of the old (rude 
keynesian) macroeconomic policy and price interventionism. It provides the ground for a 
more refined, intellectual-appealing interventionism.17 The definitional elasticity of the 
cluster concept undermines the operationality of the theory while simultaneously making 
it an ideal tool for politicians. As Porter (1998, p. 102) himself admits, “drawing cluster 
boundaries is often a matter of degree, and involves a creative process informed by 
understanding the most important linkages and complementarities across industries and 
institutions to competition.” This can only mean that the exact shape of clusters is related 
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 As Martin and Sunley (2003, p. 12) observe, the notion of cluster can be used in a variety of situations, 
“depending on what the aim of the exercise is, or the client or policymaker for whom the analysis is 
intended.” 
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to the discretionary choice of policymakers. Any attempt to circumscribe a group of 
related companies based upon a certain criterion runs the danger of overlooking 
important clusters; at the same time, too many firms might be selected and clusters can be 
loosely defined. 
The policy recommendation concerning the promotion of clusters overlooks 
important economic insights. First of all, the formation of clusters enhances the 
productivity of individuals only if it springs naturally from the voluntary actions of the 
producers. To say that a higher agglomeration of firms (at the extreme, a single 
comprehensive cluster) encourages unconditionally the deepening of specialization, 
development of trade, promotes innovation and supports an increasing of economic 
growth, is to treat mechanistically human actions. It is true that cluster formation 
decreases some economic costs, because businessmen do not have to incur the same 
expenditures with transportation and search costs. But following similar reasoning, an 
extension of the number of producers on the market – that is, a deepening of the division 
of labor – increases search costs. Yet, as it is absurd to consider that agglomeration 
promotes society’s welfare just because, by decreasing transportation and search costs, it 
simplifies trade and production, it is no more reasonable to assume that industrial clusters 
bring an increasing of welfare. Individuals do not wish unconditionally to avoid 
transaction costs by eliminating the distance among them. Beyond a certain level, 
increased agglomeration does not result in net positive external benefits, but in negative 
externalities. An important question for the entrepreneur deciding the location of its 
venture is whether agglomeration benefits are higher than congestion costs. The issue 
cannot be settled by an independent observer, because respective benefits and costs 
cannot be determined objectively. Therefore, the optimal density of investments can be 
discerned only by entrepreneurial judgement of market conditions. 
It is difficult to prove empirically that clustering is by necessity beneficial. Rather, 
as history illustrates, people prefer to spread even if, as a consequence of their choice, the 
transportation expenses increase. On a free market, entrepreneurs will try to respond 
accurately to the demands of their customers, providing goods in the locations preferred 
by the public. Therefore, only on a free market would it be possible to discover what is 
the optimal size or the proper shape of a firm or cluster. Since political action is not a 
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substitute for voluntary cooperation, the merits of a discretionary intervention on the 
organization of production are highly questionable. 
Territorial industrial agglomerations spring from entrepreneurs’ undertakings. In 
other words, the characteristics of a cluster are the outcome of speculative actions. 
Consequently, not all clusters spur the competitiveness of their members. There are 
examples of cluster failures.18 Businesses cluster together when entrepreneurs deem this 
decision to have a positive impact on their profits. In the opposite the case, industries will 
decide to remove their production units to new places. A number of factors can explain 
the decision of companies to disband a cluster: traffic congestion, increase in the price of 
land or labor, technological isomorphism and the risk of over-specialization (Martin and 
Sunley 2003, p. 27). Put it shortly, “Clusters dissolve when costs become too high for 
industries to remain competitive” (Buss 1999, p. 368). In fact, the point that clusters do 
not necessarily increase the competitiveness of member firms is acknowledged by Porter 
himself, when he states: “When a cluster shares a uniform approach to competing, a sort 
of groupthink often reinforces old behaviors, suppresses new ideas, and creates rigidities 
that prevent adoption of improvements.  Clusters also might not support truly radical 
innovation, which tends to invalidate the existing pools of talent, information, suppliers, 
and infrastructure. In these circumstances, a cluster participant….might suffer from 
greater barriers to perceiving the need to change…”  (Porter 2000, p. 24, emphasis 
added.)  
Clusters represent a form of industrial organization. It results from the uncessant 
attempt of entrepreneurs to arrange the structure of production so as to fulfill to the best 
extent possible the consumers’ demands. Therefore, clusters are specific consequences of 
entrepreneurial ventures.19 As Feldman and Francis (2004, p. 130) observes, “the process 
of cluster development is neither linear nor fully predictable.” The actual statistical image 
of a cluster reflects past businesses relationships and cannot serve as an indication of its 
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foundation for largely failed policies that attempt to jump-start growth in clusters by directive policy.”  
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 “Clustering is the result of entrepreneurial activity and is driven by the production of valued goods to 
seize profits. Governments cannot therefore supersede the market in the creation of clusters.” (Desrochers 
and Sautet 2004, p. 238-239). 
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future evolution. Government meddling with clusters is tantamount to interference in the 
entrepreneurial process by which resources are directed toward the fulfillment of the 
market participants’ most urgent needs. It introduces artificial incentives that weaken the 
inherent coordinative quality of market incentives.20 
Instead of reasoning in terms of “externalities” and “market failure”, it is time for 
mainstream economists to realize that government is a substantive source of 
entrepreneurial discoordination. Through its trade policy – imposing different regulations 
and technical specifications, customs duties, quotas, voluntary export adjustments – 
immigration laws, regulations concerning capital movement etc., the state is the only 
source of barriers for trade and economic (inter-regional) integration. In addition, 
industries’ decisions concerning localization are also indirectly influenced by the 
government policy. State intervention is the object of individuals’ anticipations, and it 
consequently changes the behavior of economic agents. If market participants expect a 
change in government policy, they will act in order to capture all the benefits and 
minimize the losses arising from that policy. For example, apparent lack of delocalization 
to improve the coordination of production is due to the expected shift of industrial policy. 
Therefore, far from being an exogenous variable, geographical disparities in the 
production structure should be considered as dependent on the political institutions 
governing the market process. 
Another problem, perhaps more relevant for those economists accepting an 
innocent view of the state, because it explodes any practical relevance of the Porterian 
theory, arises because of the lack of any independent criteria to establish the proper shape 
of a cluster. The complementarity criterion put forward by the argument is not 
permanent, but changes over time.21 Technical progress provides new methods of 
combination among inputs and new complementarity patterns between production 
processes. Changes in individual preferences cause the relative prices of goods to vary 
permanently and this, in turn, increases or reduces the number of closed substitutes and 
complements for any given good. The concrete specialization of economic units is also 
determined by the actual array of relative prices. All this makes the attempt to 
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 Besides this, Barkley and Henry (1997) discusses several shortcomings of cluster development strategies. 
21
 Porter (1998) admits this explicitly: “Clusters continually evolve as new companies and industries 
emerge or decline and as local institutions develop and change.”  
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circumscribe economic clusters illusory, because these industrial districts continually 
change. Therefore, correcting market coordination failures through clusters’ development 
appears more as a recipe for chaos than a serious suggestion for a new industrial policy. 
  
5. Coordination and government intervention 
 
Leaving aside the criticism outlined above, it is interesting to analyze the details 
of development economists’ strategy for government intervention. 
First, consider the importance many economists attach to the evaluation of 
investment projects by independent collective bodies. It is become a custom for 
governments to use boards of independent experts to evaluate the merits of different 
business plans competing for public financing. Since development economists are so 
optimistic about the quality of such an institutional invention, the natural question that 
arises is: why not extend the “mechanism” to all businesses and investment projects? The 
government could tax away individuals’ income and then redistribute it according to the 
authoritative views of the “panel of experts”. Development economists seem not to notice 
how much their argument can prove. 
One of the merits of the proposed scheme is transparency. Unlike the early vision 
of industrial policy which saw in the policymaker a benevolent social planner, the new 
development economics attempts to incorporate (albeit in an unsatisfactorily manner) the 
public choice insights about the nature of the political process. It emphasizes the 
importance of transparency as a standard for assessing state industrial initiatives. But why 
is transparency so important about government policy? Freezing commodities’ prices or 
wages is a very transparent political measure. Yet at the present, it is far from being 
advocated by policymakers, because its harmful effects have become widely 
understood.22 This example shows that transparency is not a proper criterion to evaluate 
policy initiatives. 
 Despite their efforts to differentiate their proposal from the older industrial policy, 
the distinctions authors like Porter, Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare introduce are nothing 
                                                          
22
 One could argue that government is always tempted to choose the least transparent measures available at 
the moment. 
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more than rhetorical innovations. As a number of writers have aptly noted,23 the new sort 
of interventionism amounts to nothing more than picking winners. In a sense, this new 
political activism can incur even higher costs on society than previous attempts to 
engineer development. Since picking clusters means that policymakers should target 
groups of companies or industries, rather than specific businesses, the magnitude of 
potential failures increases considerably. If government’s privileges fail to promote 
growth, than the outcome will be not punctual bankruptcies as in the past, but the 
occurrence of clusters of losses.24  
 According to Rodrik, the policy of correcting coordination failures need not 
consist in subsidization. As he explains, “it is the logic of coordination failures that once 
the simultaneous investments are made all of them end up profitable. Therefore none of 
the investors needs to be subsidized ex post, unless there is an additional reason (i.e., a 
non-pecuniary externality) that such subsidization is required.” What is needed in order 
to induce entrepreneurs to start complementary investments is an “ex-ante subsidy”, 
consisting for example in a implicit bail-out or an investment guarantee. Put it this way, 
the “new” industrial policy seems to be apparently immune against much of the virus of 
excessive public spending, deficits and malinvestment usually associated with 
government activity. But it is still exposed to corruption, rent seeking and moral hazard 
that eventually have the same distorting effect on the production structure. 
 There is still a huge gap between the actual arguments about the necessity of 
solving coordination failure through government-sponsored mechanisms and the 
requirements these arguments have to fulfill in order to be considered scientifically valid. 
As Beaulier and Subrick (2006) show, development economists have to acknowledge the 
fact that social planners are neither benevolent nor omniscient. However, the free market 
cannot be defended successfully by pointing out that policymakers do not posses enough 
information to allocate resources optimally, or by emphasizing the corruptive nature of 
the state. Perhaps government bureaucrats are both smarter (and better informed) than 
private entrepreneurs, and well intended. This hypothesis is, of course, completely 
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 See, for example, Desrochers and Sautet (2004), Buss (1999a). 
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 Desrochers (2004, p. 239) notes that it is not clear whether cluster-based regional development policy is 
beneficial for the future of these regions, given that “diversified local economies are more stable than 
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imaginary, but it should not be dismissed only because it is empirically irrelevant. 
Government interventionism has to be criticized granted that policymakers are morally 
and intellectually the best members of society. 
In spite of its new clothes, government interventionism has no more solid 
foundation that it ever had. The problem with industrial policy is deeper than most of its 
critics admit. Starting with Mises (1990), a large Austrian literature argued that in the 
absence of private property, money prices cannot emerge and economic calculation is 
impossible. At the limit, in a socialist commonwealth, the central planner has no rational 
way to decide whether to shift resources from project A to project B. Its intervention is 
arbitrary because cannot be subjected to the profit and loss test, as private activities are. 
As Rothbard (1962, p. 825) observed, any puctual decision to socialize investment 
introduces an island of calculational chaos in the market economy. Promises to bail-out 
entrepreneurs in case they fail to operate profitably, as Rodrik indicates, amount in a de 
facto socialization of private investments. 
The advocates of industrial policy think government can act as private businesses 
do, using the profit and loss criterion to decide between different investment projects. At 
this point, Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 28) believes that, “at least in principle, one could 
calculate a social return for such an investment. With limited resources, the obvious 
approach would be to invest in the proposals that entail the highest social returns. The 
problem, of course, is that calculating such social returns is very difficult. One (perhaps 
limited) way to interpret prospective studies is as a way to facilitate this calculation.” 
Here, the author (to his own merit) touches the real problem of industrial policy. The 
state is not an entrepreneur, so it is not in position to “interpret” prospective studies the 
same way private individuals do.25 More precisely, policymakers cannot calculate as 
private entrepreneurs do. Therefore, their decision is merely a “leap into darkness”. 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
highly specialized regions that are more prone to abrupt decline if their main line of business is supplanted 
by competitors located elsewhere or if new and better substitute products are manufactured elsewhere.” 
25
 Rather, as Buss (1999b, p. 367) says, “there are only individual or group interests that use public 
authority to their benefit, often at the expense of others.” 
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 In this paper I have tried to prove that the coordination failure argument does not 
provide a solid ground for a reshaping of the industrial policy both because of its lack of 
sound theoretical foundation, and because of its empirical irrelevance. We have seen that 
at the root of the argument is a misunderstanding of the role of entrepreneurs in industrial 
organization. Spatial localization is one dimension of the entrepreneurial action. 
Although the lack of conceptual precision makes the case for industrial policy appealing, 
coordination and cluster analysis cannot be used to improve the allocation of resources 
above the level reached on a free market. There is no recipe for clusters. Cluster-based 
targeting is so widely practiced not because of scientific merit, but for political reasons. 
Last, but not in the least, the rationale for clustering initiatives fails to address properly 
the information, incentives and calculation problems which plague economic policy in 
general. Thus, numerous pitfalls prevent the “new” industrial policy to be considered a 
refined ingredient of development economics. 
 
 References 
 
Anderson, David E. 2005. “The Spatial Nature of Entrepreneurship.” The Quarterly  
Journal of Austrian Economics 8(2): 21-34.  
Andersson, Thomas, Serger, Sylvia, S., Sörvik, Jens and Hansson, Emily W. 2004. The  
Cluster Policies Whitebook. International Organisation for Knowledge Economy  
and Enterprise Development. Malmö 
Beaulier, Scott A. and Subrick, Robert J. 2006. “Poverty Traps and the Robust Political  
 Economy of Development Assistance.” The Review of Austrian Economics  
 19(2/3): 217-226. 
Bergman, Edward M. and Feser, Edward J. 1999. “Industrial and Regional Clusters:  
Concepts and Comparative Applications.” In: Jackson, R. W. (Ed.) The Web Book  
of Regional Science, Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University, 
http://www.rri.wvu.edu/WebBook/Bergman-Feser/contents.htm. 
Block, Walter. 1983. “Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads”. Journal of  
 Libertarian Studies 7(1): 1-34 
Bresnahan, Timothy, Gambardella, Alfonso and Saxennian, AnnaLee. 2001. “’Old  
 21 
Economy’ Inputs for ‘New Economy’ Outcomes: Cluster Formation in the New  
Sillicon Valleys”. Industrial and Corporate Change 10(4): 835-860 
Buss, Terry F. 1999a. “The Case Against Targeted Industry Strategies”. Economic  
Development Quarterly 13(4): 339-356 
Buss, Terry F. 1999b. “To Target or Not to Target, That’s the Question: A Response to  
Wiewel and Finkle”. Economic Development Quarterly 13(4): 365-370 
Chapman, Keith. 2005. “From ‘Growth Centre’ to ‘Cluster’: Restructuring, Regional  
Development, and the Teeside Chemical Indutry.” Environment and Planning A  
37: 597-615. 
Danson, Michael and Whittam, Geoff. 1999. Regional Governance, Institutions and  
Development. In: Jackson, R. W. (Ed.) The Web Book of Regional Science,  
Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University  
http://www.rri.wvu.edu/WebBook/Danson/chapterfive.htm 
Desrochers, Pierre. 2001. “Geographical Proximity and the Transmission of Tacit  
Knowledge.” Review of Austrian Economics14 (1): 25–46. 
Desrochers, Pierre and Sautet, Frédéric. 2004. “Cluster-Based Economic Strategy,  
Facilitation Policy and the Market Process”. Review of Austrian Economics  
17(2/3): 233-245  
European Commission. 2002. Regional Clusters in Europe, Observatory of European  
SMEs, No. 3, Brussels. 
European Commission. 2003. Final Report of the Expert Group on Enterprise Clusters  
and Networks, Brussels. 
Feldmann, Maryann P., and Francis, Johanna. 2004. “Homegrown Solutions: Fostering  
Cluster Formation.” Economic Development Quarterly 18(2): 127-137 
Feldmann, Maryann P., Francis, Johanna and Bercowitz, Janet. 2005. “Creating a Cluster  
While Building a Firm: Entrepreneurs and the Formation of Industrial Clusters.”  
Regional Studies 39(1): 129-141 
Ferris, Stephen and Gawande, Kishore 1998. “Coordination Failures and Government  
Policy: Evidence From Emerging Countries.” Carleton Economic Papers 3 
Feser, Edward. 2002. “The Relevance of Clusters for Regional Innovation Policy.” White  
Paper prepared for the World Bank, Latin American and Caribbean Group.  June 
 22 
Gordon, Ian R. and McCann, Philip. 2000. “Industrial Clusters: Complexes,  
Agglomeration and/or Social Networks?”. Urban Studies 37(3): 513-532. 
Hirschman, A.O. 1957. The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, CT: Yale 
 University Press. 
Hoff, Karla and Stiglitz, Joseph. 2001. “Modern Economic Theory and Development.” In  
Meier, G. and Stiglitz, J. E. eds. Frontiers of Development Economics: The  
Future in Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 389-485. 
Hoff, Karla. 2000. “Beyond Rosenstein-Rodan: The Modern Theory of Coordination  
Problems in Development.” In Pleskovic, B. ed. Proceedings of the Annual World  
Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington DC: World Bank 
Holcombe, Randall G. 1997. “A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods”. Review of  
Austrian Economics 10(1): 1-22 
Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. 1989. A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism. Boston. Kluwer 
Howitt, Peter. “Coordination Failures”. In Vane H. and Snowdon B. eds. An  
Encyclopaedia of Macroeconomics. Edward Elgar 
Hummel, Jeffrey R. 1990. “National Goods Versus Public Goods: Defense.  
Disarmament. and Free Riders”. Review of Austrian Economics 4: 88-122 
IRE. 2005. An overview of Cluster Policies and Clusters in the New Member States of the  
European Union. Innovating Regions in Europe. http://www.innovating-
regions.org 
Ketels, Christian H. M. 2005. “European Clusters”. The Competitiveness Institute 
Marshall, David. 1998. “Understanding the Asian crisis: Systemic Risk as Coordination  
Failure”. Economic Perspectives:13-28. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Maskell, Peter and Kebir, Leila. 2005. What qualifies as a cluster theory?. DRUID  
Working Paper no. 05-09 
Martin, Ron and Sunley, Peter. 2003. “Deconstructing Clusters: Chaotic Concept or  
Policy Panacea?”. Journal of Economic Geography 3: 5-35 
Mises, Ludwig von. 1998. Human Action. Scholar’s edition. Auburn. Ala.: Ludwig von  
Mises Institute 
Mises, Ludwig von. 1990. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth.  
Auburn. Ludwig von Mises Institute 
 23 
Nadvi Khalid and Barrientos Stephanie. 2004. Industrial Clusters and Poverty Reduction.  
Towards a methodology for poverty and social impact assessment of cluster  
development initiatives. UNIDO. Vienna 
Sölvell, Örjan, Ketels, Christian H. and Lindqvist, Göran. 2003. The Cluster Initiative  
Greenbook, The Competitiveness Institute/Vinnova: Gothenburg. 
Porter, Michael. 2000. “Location, Competition, and Economic Development: Local  
Clusters in a Global Economy.” Economic Development Quarterly, 14(1): 15–34 
Porter, Michael. 1998a. On Competition. Harvard University Press: Cambridge 
Porter, Michael. 1998b. “Clusters and the New Economics of Competition”  
Harvard Business Review 76(6): 77-90 
Porter, Michael. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. The Free Press. New  
York. 
Rodriguez-Clare, Andres. 2005a. “Coordination Failures, Clusters and Microeconomic  
Interventions.” Inter-American development Bank Working Paper. June 
Rodriguez-Clare, Andres. 2005b. “Clusters and Comparative Advantage: Implications for  
Industrial Policy.” Inter-American development Bank Working Paper 523.  
December 
Rodrik, Dani. 2004. “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century”. Working Paper.  
 October. Harvard University 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul. 1943. “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and  
Southeastern Europe.” Economic Journal 53(210-211) June-September: 202-211. 
Rothbard, Murray. 1962. Man, Economy and State: A Treatise on Economics. Princeton,  
D. Van Nostrand 
Salerno, Joseph T. 1991. “The Concept of Coordination in Austrian Macroeconomics”. In  
Champions of Freedom: Austrian Economics: Perspectives on the Past and  
Prospects for the Future. Hillsdale. Hillsdale College Press 
Sautet, Frédéric. 2002. Economic Transformation, The Pretence of Knowledge and the  
Process of Entrepreneurial Competition. New Zealand Treasury Discussion Paper 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/et/#9 
UNCTAD. 2002. Partnerships and Networking in Science and Technology for  
Development. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  
 24 
Technology for Development Series, Geneva.  
http://www.kiet.re.kr/files/econo/20020325-partner.pdf. 
UNIDO. 2001. Development of Clusters and Networks of SMEs: The UNIDO  
Programme. United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Vienna. 
Yehoue, Etienne B. 2005. “Clusters as a Driving Engine for FDI”. IMF Working Paper  
05/93 
